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1. Introduction 
In the history of the Belgian electricity production and distribution, Fernand Courtoy takes an 
important, but somewhat peculiar position. In his quest to find an efficient organisation of the 
Belgian electricity supply, his starting point is that of an engineer in an industrial company that 
is at the same time bulk consumer and self-producer. This is a completely different point of 
departure than that of companies that only produce electricity to sell it to others and differs as 
well from the politico-economic, ideological motives of politicians. Both of these other 
motivations had, however, dominated the debates on the organisation of the Belgian electricity 
supply around the turn of the 20th century. Courtoy’s insights as an engineer and his ability to 
repeatedly manoeuver himself central in the decision-making process speak of his tactical skill 
as well as of his knowledge of a wide range of aspects concerning the production of electricity. 
Particularly remarkable is his adherence to a vision he set out early in his career and which he 
coherently elaborated across different contexts and scales during the following decades. 
Studying the endeavours of Fernand Courtoy therefore provides a unique insight in the inner 
workings of the changing electricity sector of the interbellum and in the territorialisation of the 
Belgian electricity production and distribution. 
Specific to the Belgian context is the territorial condition in which the electrical infrastructure 
was implemented. Already before the effective appliance of electricity, a spatial policy was 
pursued that favoured the strong dispersion of activities, people and functions. Embedding the 
electricity supply in this context of dispersal at first led to a lot of small-scale electricity 
production facilities being installed. With the increase of the energy demand and the technical 
possibilities of large-scale electricity production, new ways of dealing with this condition had 
to be sought that could organise the production and distribution of electricity on a bigger scale. 
Courtoy’s plans are characterised by a careful balance between the accumulation of electricity 
production, the distributed production capacity and the dispersed energy consumption. The 
different conceptions of the role of electricity within the economic logic of other types of 
producers and consumers, however, resulted in other territorial strategies. Between the two 
world wars, several projects were undertaken to search for an efficient national organisation of 
the electricity sector that had to cope with these divergent approaches. In these projects, Courtoy 
would be actively involved. 
In 1907, Fernand Courtoy graduated from the Institut éléctrotechnique Montefiore in Liege.1 
This prestigious institute was established in 1883 as one of the world’s earliest academic 
institutions that offered advanced courses in electrical engineering.2 Before this specialisation, 
he had studied mining engineering at the University of Liège where he was also briefly 
employed as an assistant. After his studies he started working at the Société Anonyme d’Ougrée-
                                                          
1 Bertrams, K., Un partenariat à double facette? Milieux académiques et industriels dans le secteur électrique 
belge (1880-1940). Annales historiques de l’électricité 5, no. 1 (2007): 41. 
2 ibid., 39-42. 
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Marihaye, one of the numerous coal mining companies in the Liege basin that was as well a 
major iron and steel producer.3 In this company Courtoy became the chief responsible for the 
electrical equipment. It was within this context that he would become interested in the efficient 
– in his words ‘economical’ or ‘rational’ –, industrial production of electricity. 
In 1927, this interest would lead to his proposal for the organisation of electricity production 
on the national level. A proposal that was elaborated within the framework of a commission 
initiated by the national government. Before being appointed reporter of this commission, 
however, Courtoy had already seen the chance to develop his vision on several other occasions. 
Moreover, the 1927 report would not turn out to be the endpoint for Courtoy. His proposal 
would cause vivid debates within the electricity sector which, together with political turmoil 
during the 1930’s, made that the actual tackling of the issues addressed by the commission 
would be severely delayed. In the meantime, several of the report’s guidelines had been 
overtaken by events or were renegotiated. 
 
2. Clustering the Production Facilities in the Liege Basin 
Many of the ideas in Courtoy’s national plan can be traced back to his realisations in the Liege 
basin. Also Courtoy himself would refer to these accomplishments throughout the whole of his 
career. Arriving at S.A. d’Ougrée-Marihaye, the engineer found electrical equipment, used as 
well for the production of electricity as for its appliance in manufacturing process, dotted all 
over the several plants within the extensive and non-contiguous area that was conceded to the 
company. The 1906 map compiled by the Administration des mines shows six locations with  
ongoing mining activities,4 while in 1905 a fifth blast-furnace was constructed and there would 
be eight of them operational at the dawn of the First World War. This situation was the legacy 
of the company’s long history filled with takeovers and merges and gave rise to a distributed 
deployment of means and resources.5 
For the production and use of electricity this was an ineffective organisation, in technical and 
economic terms. At several location dispersed over the company’s ground, different small-
capacity production units had to be installed together with standby units to replace them in case 
of breakdown. Connecting the different production units in parallel in an electricity grid, while 
changing some of them for more efficient units with a higher production capacity would be 
more advantageous. Furthermore, such a set-up would also considerably diminish the needed 
number of backup units and would allow for a more concerted operation of the combined 
production equipment.6 Technically, such an organisation was not easy to realise, however, as 
the electricity production equipment of the company existed out of different types of machinery 
(with their own characteristics concerning frequency, cyclical regularity, adaptability, …) 
which had to be adjusted to each other. In addition, a system for the management of the grid 
had to be devised. Nonetheless, Courtoy set out to fulfil this task of coordination and succeeded 
to establish the small-scale grid of Ougrée-Marihaye by 1911. This grid had an unprecedented 
                                                          
3 Courtoy, F., Production économique de l’électricité dans les régions industrielles. Liege: Ch. Béranger, 1919: 
title page. 
4 Administration des mines, Carte des concessions houillières [map]. Bruxelles: Administration des mines, 
1906 : sheet 4. [accessible online: http://tinyurl.com/jj8hcyv, last accessed 11 August 2016]  
5 Bussière, E., La sidérurgie belge durant l'entre-deux-guerres: Le cas d'Ougrée-Marihaye (1919-1939). Belgisch 
tijdschrift voor nieuwste geschiedenis 15, no. 3-4 (1984): 304-306. 
6 Courtoy, F., Production économique de l’électricité dans les régions industrielles: 6-8. 
3 
 
technical complexity as it was globally the first operational parallel connection of such diverse 
types of production equipment.7 
Although the main challenge in this endeavour had been technological, the engineer realised 
that even more benefits could be achieved for the electricity production of the company with 
the construction of a similar set-up on a bigger scale that included more diverse ways for the 
production of electricity and its appliance. Because of Courtoy’s experience at Ougrée-
Marihaye and the already developed technological solutions, the challenge now became to 
convince potential partners and to find a form of organisation for the implementation of such a 
grid. 
Besides the arguments of being able to more efficiently use production units with a higher 
production capacity and the possibility to reduce the needed amount of backup units (or their 
employment for the raising of the combined production capacity), two more advantages came 
forward in Courtoy’s plea for the connection of production units on the regional scale. First, the 
mixed activities and working schedules of the different partners could help to ameliorate the 
load profile of the grid.8 The sum of the necessary individual production capacities would lower 
with a parallel connection because peaks in electricity demand at one location are compensated 
by lows in demands elsewhere. Coordination of the working schedules could even augment this 
effect. Second, a more considered consumption of the resources used for electricity production 
could be thought out. Large, more efficient units powered on coal of low quality or residual 
gases could provide the bulk of energy production, while diesel units, more expensive per kWh 
produced, could be started up quickly during peak demand (figure 1).9 At the scale of a single 
factory this was often not feasible as production technologies (and their combustibles) were 
often adapted to more specific energy cycles which resulted in more expensive electricity. 
 
 
fig. 1 – independent and combined load diagrams; the benefits in regard of the total load and 
the amount of production units. 
(source: Courtoy, F., Les groupements de centrales électriques en Belgiques: Philosophie des groupements, 
Materialité et économie des opérations réalisées. Brussels: Union des Centrales Électriques du Basin de Liège, 
1940: sheet 9.) 
                                                          
7 Kurgan - van Hentenryk, G., The Economic Organization of the Belgian Electrical Industry since the End of 
the 19th Century. In The Economic Development of Belgium since 1870, eds. Herman Van der Wee and Jan 
Blomme, 238-54. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1997. 243. 
8 Courtoy, F., Production économique de l’électricité dans les régions industrielles: 168-190. 
9 ibid., 73-98. 
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fig. 2 – map of the grid of the UCE. 
(source: Courtoy, F., Production économique de l’électricité dans les régions industrielles. Liege: Ch. Béranger, 
1919: 204.) 
 
The Liege basin was very suitable for such a clustering (‘groupement’) of electricity generation 
plants. Around the city and along the borders of the river Meuse, a lot of heavy industry was 
concentrated, mainly in the metallurgic and coal mining sectors. For these companies, the self-
production of electricity seemed obvious since many of them traded in coal or fabricated 
residual products that could be used for energy production such as low quality coal, heat or 
residual gases.10 A strong demand for energy in their actual production processes and this 
wealth of resources made that the different companies all had their own electricity production 
facilities. Moreover, the rhythm of the coal mining industry differed from that of the production 
of steel.11 Together with the specific load profile of the public electricity companies (mainly 
destined for lighting, agriculture and private use) this resulted in a sufficient variability enabling 
the obtaining of considerable benefits by the balancing of the load in a shared grid. 
Almost directly after the completion of the Ougrée-Marihaye network Courtoy secured the 
support and cooperation of several partners in the Liege basin (figure 2) and started studying 
the issue more concretely.12 A first article containing related set-ups abroad and the guiding 
principles of his proposal was presented and published in 1914.13 While the book manuscript 
of his final result was also ready the same year the First World War halted its publication.14 
                                                          
10 ibid., 156. 
11 ibid., 182. 
12 ibid., preface. 
13 Courtoy, F., Production économique de l’électricité dans les régions industrielles. Revue Universelle des 
Mines de la Métallurgie, des Travaux Publics, des Sciences et des Arts appliquée à l'Industrie 5th series, vol. 
II (1914): 1-45. 
14 Courtoy, F., Production économique de l’électricité dans les régions industrielles. 
5 
 
Eventually, the outcome of his study would only be published in 1919 and the first parts of the 
grid only be operating from 1920.15 
Most of the technical obstacles to connect the electric equipment of the various companies could 
be solved analogously to the Ougrée-Marihaye network. New technical challenges were the 
connection of different types of company grids. Some of these still used a direct current 500 V 
grid, while the others used three-phase alternating current, all at a frequency of 50 Hz, but with 
different voltages ranging from 2100 V to 6300 V. To combine these characteristics into a 
single, ‘universal grid’16 Courtoy designed three types of substations in which the electricity 
current would be transformed from the characteristics of the individual companies to those of 
the three-phase transportation grid running at 50 Hz and 6300 V (and vice versa).17 
Furthermore, the substations and the transportation lines were equipped with the necessary 
safety mechanisms in order to contain and diminish the damage in case of accident or failure.18 
The production of electricity and the coordination of the grid was dealt with centrally. To do so 
Courtoy made use of a system he had encountered during his study of the electricity grid of 
Durham and Northumberland.19 A central office was connected by telephone to all of the 
different electricity production facilities and also received information from signals and sensors 
all over the network. By studying the load diagrams and the state of the network, technicians 
were able to manage the many electricity production units almost in real-time. From this 
coordinating office, orders to put into action, halt or regulate the charge of the individual units 
were sent around the grid, guaranteeing the system’s proper functioning. 
The main difference between Courtoy’s proposal and the NESCO-grid in Durham and 
Northumberland was that the latter’s production stations belonged to a single firm.20 For the 
Liege endeavour it would be crucial that every of the associated companies could pursue its 
own corporate policy except for their electricity production. This had to be managed as if it 
belonged to a single firm. Therefore, some very clear rules did apply in this sector: First, the 
associated companies could not sell or buy electricity outside the organisation. Second, 
immediate and ‘absolute obedience’ to the directives of the coordinating technicians was 
imperative. The association would be formed as a cooperative society with the full use of the 
member’s production facilities and an equal share of the costs needed for the construction of 
the network as requirements for accession. The cooperative was directed by delegates of the 
different factories and was called Union des Centrales Électriques du Basin de Liège, often 
abbreviated as UCE.21 
The main task of  UCE was to provide electricity to its stakeholders at the lowest price possible. 
For the exchange of electricity between associated companies Courtoy devised a complex 
method to determine the price based on a mediation of the apparent and the real benefits of both 
the producer and consumer in accordance with the specific situation in which the electricity was 
exchanged.22 Later on, he would develop a simpler method he called ‘EREFKA’. This method 
took into account the aspects of depreciation and interests of the equipment (r), the fixed 
                                                          
15 Courtoy, F., Les groupements de centrales électriques en Belgiques: Philosophie des groupements, Materialité 
et économie des opérations réalisées. Brussels: Union des Centrales Électriques du Basin de Liège, 1940: 24. 
16 see Hughes, T.P., Networks of Power: Electrification in Western Society, 1880-1930.  Baltimore: John 
Hopkins University Press, 1983: 122-125. 
17 Courtoy, F., Production économique de l’électricité dans les régions industrielles: 198-205. 
18 ibid., 212-214. 
19 Courtoy, F., Production économique de l’électricité dans les régions industrielles: 6-9. 
Courtoy, F., Production économique de l’électricité dans les régions industrielles: 141-145 & 214-215. 
20 see Hughes, T.P., op. cit.: 443-460.  
21 Courtoy, F., Production économique de l’électricité dans les régions industrielles: 277-284. 
22 Ibid., 250-276. 
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production costs (f) and the price for the combustibles that varied with the load on the 
production unit (k).23 In order to fulfil its principal task UCE could as well sell electricity to 
third parties and enrol activities related to the production of electricity. Financial profit made 
from these activities could be invested in the union or be paid out to the associated companies.24 
  
3. Engineering the Electricity Legislation 
The establishment of the UCE was the first of such cooperative associations in Europe25 and 
proved to be highly successful. For a large part this was because of its location that was very 
favourable with its concentration of industrial activity. None of this could have been realised, 
however, without the consent of the municipality of Liege. The city, just as any other Belgian 
municipality, had to grant access to its municipal roads for the construction of the transportation 
and distribution lines of electricity. Without municipal permission only private property and the 
sides of provincial or national roads and railroads could have been used. Municipal refusal 
would have made it almost impossible to construct the network Courtoy foresaw. 
Most of the time, municipalities did not bother much about the usage of their roads. Yet, the 
road permissions formed the backbone of a concessionary system that reserved the use of the 
municipal infrastructure to specific actors for specific purposes.26 Many cities and villages had 
already granted a concession for the distribution of electricity to a private firm, or sometimes 
the exclusive right to distribute electricity was automatically included in a gas or (public) 
lighting concession. Once such a concession was granted, these concessionaires could contest 
the construction of other electricity networks (that crossed municipal ground), or could demand 
a compensatory fee.27 Industrial self-producers with establishments across the same road could 
legally be denied the crossing of that road for their electricity distribution.28 In the case of Liege, 
an additional advantage for Courtoy’s plan was that since 1913 the city’s electricity distribution 
was provided by a public company. 
Because of this concessionary system a type of electricity producers different than that of the 
industrial self-producers had emerged. Since they combined the activities of electricity 
production and distribution, they were referred to as ‘producer-distributors’. After establishing 
a production unit, these companies attempted to obtain a sufficient amount of concessions in 
order to assemble an area in which they would have the exclusive right for electricity 
distribution. The territorial strategy of the producer-distributors was in line with Belgian spatial 
policy. This policy was aimed at the dispersal of industrial activities and people all over the 
national territory instead of its concentration in urban cores. By the demarcation of regional 
monopolies producer-distributors were able to accumulate the necessary volume of 
consumption. Because of the national policy of dispersal such a volume was, except at some 
historical urban cores, unavailable at a single location. 
                                                          
23 Courtoy, F., La tarification "EREFKA": Son application au règlement des échanges dans les groupements de 
centrales électriques. Revue universelle des mines etc 7th series, vol. XI, no. 2 (1926): 58-68. 
Courtoy, F., Les groupements de centrales électriques en Belgiques: 47-54. 
24 Courtoy, F., Production économique de l’électricité dans les régions industrielles: 277-284. 
25 Kurgan - van Hentenryk, G., op. cit., 243. 
Brion, R., and Moreau J.L., Tractebel 1895-1995: Les métamorphoses d'un groupe industriel. Antwerp: 
Mercatorfonds, 1995: 156. 
26 Maes, R., De overheidsbemoeiing op het gebied van de elektriciteitsvoorziening in België. Brugge: Die Keure, 
1967: 23-26. 
27 ibid. 3. 
28 De Jonge, S., De elektriciteitssektor in België: Van gemeentelijk tot partikulier monopolie? De totstandkoming 
van de wet op de elektriciteitsvoorziening van 10 Maart 1925. Belgisch tijdschrift voor nieuwste geschiedenis 
16, no. 3-4 (1985): 372-374. 
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Both the industrial consumers, a part of which produced its own electricity, and the 
municipalities looked warily upon the producer-distributors. The regional scale on which these 
companies operated sidelined the latter, because collaboration between municipalities was 
prohibited. Later on, this was remedied by provincial initiatives and the 1922 law on 
intermunicipal cooperation.29 By then, the producer-distributors had, however, already 
established themselves quite firmly. The industrial consumers from their part believed that the 
lack of competition caused by the monopolies caused prices to be artificially high. Also the 
restrictions on the use of their self-produced energy remained to be a thorn to their side. 
Certainly the heavy industry was concerned about its dependence to the producer-distributors 
for a resource this vital for the continuation of their production processes. 
From the turn of the twentieth century onwards, several of the engineering societies, 
strongholds of industrial interests, therefore plead for a reform of the concessionary system for 
the distribution of electricity. In 1906, a parliamentary committee is established that has to 
research the possibility of a specific legislation for this utility system.30 To defend their position, 
the producer-contributors found the Union des Exploitations Électriques en Belgique (UEEB) 
in 1911, which develops a counterproposal for the work of this committee.31 The First World 
War then interrupts the work on a legal framework for the electricity sector in Belgium, but 
when hostilities ceased, the debate continues. New rounds of consultation and new proposals, 
ranging from a status quo over the total liberalisation to the nationalisation of the electricity 
production and distribution sectors, succeed one another. In 1922, the law on intermunicipal 
cooperation is voted, setting aside some of the objections of the local authorities. The same 
year, the Associations des Centrales Électriques Industrielles en Belgique (ACEIB) is 
established to represent the interests of the industrial producers of electricity.32 Courtoy, by now 
highly respected for his work on the UCE, was one of the driving forces behind this organisation 
and would use it as a platform to communicate his views on the legal statute of electricity 
distribution.33 
On 10 March 1925, the Belgian national parliament finally adopted a law on the distribution of 
electricity.34 This law could be seen as a compromise between the standpoints of the UEEB and 
the ACEIB.35 On the one hand, bulk consumers needing a supply above 1000 kW (during a 
period of a quarter of an hour) were from now on excluded from the concessionary system. The 
electricity market for these consumers was liberalised and the permissions for the construction 
of high-voltage power lines were dealt with by the provinces and the state. On the other hand, 
the producer-distributors maintained their monopoly for all other customers. Municipalities still 
had to grant road permits for the construction of distribution grids, which from now on also 
included the use of the national and provincial roads on the municipal territory. For the 
producer-distributors, the exclusivity of such a distribution network remained an important 
advantage in the supply of the dispersed industrial activities. Lastly, the parliament recognised 
the electricity production and distribution as a public utility. As a result, it became easier for 
the government to actively intervene in the sector and to expropriate land for the construction 
of electricity grids. 
                                                          
29 Maes, R., op. cit.: 16-23. 
30 De Jonge, S., op. cit.: 374-380. 
31 ibid. 380-384.  
32 Brion, R., and Moreau J.L., op.cit: 160. 
33 see for example Courtoy, F., Bases rationelles d'un statut juridique concernant la production et la répartition de 
l'énergie électrique. Revue universelle des mines etc 6th series, vol. XVII (1923): 173-81. 
a list of such articles can be found in Courtoy, F., Les groupements de centrales électriques en Belgiques: 7-8. 
34 Maes, R., op. cit.: 69-150. 
35 De Jonge, S., op. cit.: 384-391. 
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4. Organising the National Electricity Production 
In the closing paragraphs of his study on the electricity grid for the Liege basin, Courtoy 
arguments that the parallel connection of electricity production units can also be achieved 
elsewhere in the country and that ‘in this way, Belgium would realise an almost ideal mode of 
electricity production and distribution’.36 He therefore sets the industry a task: ‘Today, let us 
apply the device of our country: “Union makes strength” [l’union fait la force]; Let us cluster 
our centrals, and we will be able to state that the present work will have as its emblem: “Profit, 
security and progress in the Union”’.37 Already during the war, Courtoy himself commences to 
work on this task and, in 1919 – simultaneously with the delayed publication of his study on 
the Liege basin from which the above phrases are quoted – he presents the outlines for what he 
sees as the most efficient organisation for Belgium’s (industrial) electricity production.38 
Around the same time, Courtoy quits his job at Ougrée-Marihaye and establishes the Bureau 
d’Études Industrielles Fernand Courtoy in Brussels. This engineering office offered 
consultancy to the industrial companies on a wide aspect of issues, among which of course 
electricity, but was also hired by public instances.  For the latter it was involved in the design 
of local and regional distribution plans as well as strategies for the electrification of whole 
provinces.39 In 1928, the office also started to publish a monthly (and from 1935 onwards 
bimonthly) bulletin in which technological advances, legal or economic topical matters were 
discussed that concerned the industrial sector.40 Courtoy himself stayed involved in the 
installation of the UCE and continued to promote the virtues of this model of organisation. 
Furthermore, he kept actively lobbying for the interests of the industry in the electricity sector 
as one of the principal spokespersons of the ACEIB. 
When the Belgian government announced the creation of the Commission Nationale des 
Grandes Travaux in order to stimulate the dwindling economy by large infrastructural projects, 
Courtoy seized the opportunity to once again push for his vision for the national electricity 
production and distribution. One of the several subcommissions had to research the 
‘construction, organisation and exploitation of hydroelectric power plants’ in the hilly south of 
Belgium. Courtoy was appointed a member of the commission as a representative of the 
industrial producers, while its other members, Henri Marchal, Maurice Passelecq and 
Alexandre Wust, all came from producer-distributors.41 Despite this numerical preponderance, 
the final report of the commission, written by Courtoy, strongly bears his mark and mainly 
develops further his 1919 article. 
Already in the report’s introduction it is made clear by the commission that the discussion of 
the application of hydroelectric power has to take into account all other resources for electricity 
generation. Indeed, the always readily available potential energy stored in the reservoirs could 
be saved up for moments when the use of more fugitive (residual) resources and their heavy, 
but inexpensive production units would not suffice. In other words, the planning of the 
construction of dams requires a vision on the general organisation of the Belgian electricity 
production.42 As a result, hydroelectric power generation was relegated to the margins of the 
                                                          
36 Courtoy, F., Production économique de l’électricité dans les régions industrielles: 296. 
37 ibid., 295. 
38 Courtoy, F., Avant-projet de réorganisation de la production de l'électricité industrielle en Belgique. Revue 
universelle des mines etc 6th series, vol. II, no. 1 (1919): 1-45. 
39 See for example Maes, R., op. cit.: 51-59. 
40 This publication was called the Bulletin de documentation du Bureau d’Études Industrielles Fernand Courtoy. 
41 Brion, R., and Moreau J.L., op. cit.: 162-163. 
42 Commission Nationale des Grands Travaux: Sous-Commission des Barrages-Réservoirs en Ardennes: 
Question 8° (c-d), Organisation générale de la production de l’électricité en Belgique. Brussels: 
Weissenbruch (1927): 3-4. 
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research and the main part of the work is concerned with outlining a plan to make the existing 
electricity production more rational. 
A first study of the existing situation revealed that electricity was produced in more than 250 
facilities all over the country. These facilities had widely divergent load factors and capacities, 
worked with varying types of machinery and made use of a range of resources. Most of the 
production plants were not structurally connected to one another. More or less half of the energy 
was generated by self-producing industrials and the other half by producer-distributors (figure  
3).43 
 
fig. 3 – characteristics of the Belgian electricity production according to the CNGT. 
(source CNGT, Organisation générale de la production de l’électricité en Belgique. Brussels: Weissenbruch 
(1927): figure 2.) 
                                                          
43 ibid., 8-10. 
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fig. 4 – schematic representation of the technical concept of the CNGT. 
(source CNGT, Organisation générale de la production de l’électricité en Belgique. Brussels: Weissenbruch 
(1927): figure 15.) 
 
In the same vein as Courtoy’s clustering of the territorially dispersed production units of a single 
company and the subsequent parallel connection of the energy generation of different 
companies on a regional scale, the commission proposes to add another layer to the organisation 
of the electricity production. All over Belgium, regional electricity unions modelled after the 
UCE should be established and, in their turn, be coordinated by a national union.44 This union 
would have to regulate the electricity exchange between the different regional unions, much in 
the same way as these entities operated in relation to their associated companies. To make this 
exchange possible, a national high voltage grid had to be constructed that was to link the 
different unions (figure 4). 
According to the commission, the clustering of thirteen existing centres of production could 
generate the electricity needed for Belgium in 1927. By the selective reinforcement of some of 
these centres and the construction of two hydroelectric power plants, they should also be 
capable of meeting the nation’s estimated electricity demand for 1935. The thirteen centres 
could be grouped in nine different unions – one for each province – and every union would 
have a major connection point to the high voltage grid (figure 5). Furthermore, the commission 
also envisaged three international connections for the grid to the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg 
and France.45 
                                                          
44 ibid., 20-21. 
45 ibid., 11-15. 
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fig. 5 – project for an high voltage grid by the CNGT. 
(source CNGT, Organisation générale de la production de l’électricité en Belgique. Brussels: Weissenbruch 
(1927): figure 9.) 
 
fig. 6 – scheme of the organisation of the CNGT. 
(source CNGT, Organisation générale de la production de l’électricité en Belgique. Brussels: Weissenbruch 
(1927): figure 14.) 
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The arguments in favour for this organisation did not differ much from those brought forward 
in the 1919 study on the regional clustering of electricity production. The national scale and the 
context of the commission’s report, however, gave them another dimension. Instead of being 
simply a rational, efficient and economical organisation advantageous for the participating 
companies, the proposals now seemed to be developed for the common good.46 The plan was 
said to advance the national economy and hence contributed to the wellbeing of the country and 
its people. 
This idea was also reflected in the composition that was proposed for the different unions. ‘[A] 
policy of broad entry [large accueil]’ should be followed.47 All types of producers (public 
companies, industrial (self-)producers and producer-distributors) should be represented, 
together with delegates of the government and of those consumers for whom the electricity 
supply did not fall under any monopoly of distribution. The consumption and the consumers, 
and with it the distributors of electricity, thus became more prominent in the organisation of the 
unions (figure 6). While the cooperative spirit of the UCE should remain, the unions’ different 
types of activities and the diverging contributions of its associates reformed them into ‘sociétées 
anonymes’.48 Association to the unions would not be made compulsory for any of the electricity 
producing companies, however, it would bring certain benefits. The exploitation of the 
hydroelectric power plants and the electricity provision of major public enterprises, such as the 
(to be) electrified national railroads, would ‘preferably’ be granted to the electricity unions.49 
 
5. Charges and Tensions 
In July 1927, the conclusions of the commission were approved by the national government.50 
Moreover, Courtoy was asked by the minister of industry and labour to prepare a bill that would 
provide the legal framework for the proposed organisation of the national electricity production 
and distribution.51 The engineer lost no time and tried to quickly push his vision through. Not 
only did he deliver the bill asked for, he and the ACEIB also established the Union Générale 
Belge d’Électricité (UGBE) in 1928, which had to serve as the national coordinating union.52 
Already in the commission’s report it had indeed been remarked that setting up the coordinating 
union before the regional unions could help in establishing (the compatibility between) the 
latter.53 
The same year, Courtoy and the UGBE would set up another union. This Union des Centrales 
Électriques du Hainaut (UCEH) would be subdivided in three smaller centres, corresponding 
to the three mining basins in its territory, those of the Borinage, Centre and Sambre. The UCE, 
finally, was renamed to Union des Centrales Électriques de Liége, Namur et Luxembourg (UCE 
Linalux) after it had expanded the area it serviced to the province of Luxembourg and partially  
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fig. 7 – organisation of the UGBE in 1940. 
(source: Courtoy, F., Les groupements de centrales électriques en Belgiques: Philosophie des groupements, 
Materialité et économie des opérations réalisées. Brussels: Union des Centrales Électriques du Basin de Liège, 
1940: sheet 3.) 
 
fig. 8 – grid managed by the CPTE with indication of the different blocks. 
(source: Courtoy, F., Les groupements de centrales électriques en Belgiques: Philosophie des groupements, 
Materialité et économie des opérations réalisées. Brussels: Union des Centrales Électriques du Basin de Liège, 
1940: annex B.) 
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that of Namur.54 The infrastructure supporting these regional unions was finished in the 
beginning of the thirties. An interconnection between both grids would be established in 1932 
and marked the start of a fully operational UGBE (figure 7).55 
From the beginning, however, this seemingly flying start of the execution of the national plan 
for the production and distribution of electricity, was surrounded by protests. Certainly the 
producer-distributors regarded Courtoy’s initiatives as direct charges on the economic 
conditions on which their industry was based. Although they had been part of the commission 
that had elaborated the plan, they seemed to have underestimated the implications of its work 
and the indisputability of its guiding lines. There seemed to be less space for negotiations than 
anticipated.56 
As an attempt to mitigate Courtoy’s proposals several major objections were raised in a series 
of letters, press releases and leaflets.57 The producer-distributors accused those in favour of the 
plan of underappreciating their efforts to supply electricity all over Belgium. Now this work 
was nearly completed, the UGBE would reap the profit of this endeavour without the producers-
distributors having had the time to make profit or receiving sufficient compensation. Even 
though association to the UGBE and its regional unions was not compulsory, the benefits 
related to association and the unbalancing effects of such an organisation would, according to 
the producer-distributors, force solitary companies into bankruptcy. The UEEB regarded the 
commission’s plan as the start of some kind of (disguised) etatism and the handing over of the 
management of their production units as expropriation. By refusing their cooperation and with 
the help of their political allies the producer-distributors were able to stall the implementation 
of the plan.58 
The deadlock thus created was even further complicated by the political context of the 1930’s. 
The global economic depression also hit Belgium and caused a succession of falling 
governments, each failing in its search for a way out of the economic malaise. From 1935 until 
the dawn of the Second World War, the socialist party BWP was part of the different 
governments. Its economic policy was based on a 1933 plan that foresaw the nationalisation 
and coordinated organisation of certain key economic sectors, among which the electricity 
sector and the financial sector (which was deeply entangled with the former). When the author 
of the plan, Paul De Man – the plan was generally known as the Plan De Man –, and his 
successor Jules Merlot failed to implement this plan, arrangements were made to have the 
electricity sector deduct a contribution from its profit. This because, in the eyes of these 
politicians, the sector parasitised on its crucial, but unassailable position in the nation’s 
economy. Also this arrangement was never imposed, however. Nonetheless, the ever imminent 
threat forced the ACEIB and the UEEB to continue negotiations on the organisation of the 
electricity production and distribution sector.59 
In the end, it were the financial interests in the sector that would push for a solution between 
both type of companies. Since the construction of large production plants, the financial 
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resources needed for electricity companies combined with the perspective of an attractive return 
had made the electricity sector an interesting investment and this across the industrial / 
producer-distributor divide. Certainly the Société Générale de Belgique, then Belgium’s most 
important investment bank, had important interests on both sides of the sector.60 Feeling these 
interests threatened, they tried to avoid the nationalisation or any other state intervention by 
developing the rational, efficient working of an autonomous, dominantly private electricity 
sector. In this way, the hoped to deprive the supporters of public ownership of their main 
arguments about the excessive charging and squandering within the electricity sector.61 In the 
view of the financial sector, the national plan brought forward by the commission envisioned 
such a rational and efficient working. It, however, had to be adapted to some of the producer-
distributors demands. After ten years of delicate negotiations this finally resulted in the 1936 
‘trusts-unions agreement’.62 
Some of the main lines from the report of the national commission are present in this secret 
agreement between the industrial (self-)producers and the producer-distributors. Still, a 
coordinating organisation manages parts of the electricity production and transportation on the 
national level. This entity, the Société pour la Coordination de la production et du Transport 
de l’Énergie Électrique (CPTE) remains however subordinate to its affiliates since it would not 
own or maintain the infrastructure it coordinates. While the CPTE appears to be similar to the 
concept of the UGBE this characteristic makes it less powerful. Another major difference lies 
in the nature of its members. The associates of the CPTE are large economic blocks that 
represent the financial interests behind the different companies (figure 8). Hence the 
composition of the CPTE, and therefore also the organisation of the electricity production and 
distribution sector in Belgium, is not based on geographical demarcations represented by the 
regional unions, but by the financial structures of the Belgian economy (compare figure 5 with 
figure 8).63 
 
6. Dispersed Consumption 
Many of the ideas of Courtoy can be brought back to his first job as electrical engineer at 
Ougrée-Marihaye. Two features of this job – the context of a large industrial company and the 
dense stretch of industrial activities along the Meuse in the Liege basin – can be said to have 
deeply influenced the position taken by the engineer in a succession of electricity production 
and distribution questions over the years. Working at an industrial company determined his 
view on the role of electricity in the production process. Except for those companies that 
produce electricity only to sell it (to a distributor or to an end user), electricity is mainly 
regarded by the industry as a resource instead of a product. To secure their access to this 
resource or because they are able to produce electricity at an economical cost, some companies 
decided to start their own electricity production. In almost none of these cases electricity 
becomes more than a by-product and the emphasis lies on the continuous reproduction of the 
conditions in which its core production can thrive. In other words, the production of electricity 
is aimed at its consumption for the production of other (superior) items.   
The geographical context of the Liege basin provides a second clue to understand many of 
Courtoy’s standpoints. While the coal mines and the metallurgic companies have played a 
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decisive role in the early establishment of the industrial economy in Belgium, they later became 
an exception in the dispersed national industrial territory. This dispersed organisation of the 
territory was deliberately created by the national elites to achieve advantages such as an easy 
access to cheap land and labour.64 To accommodate industrial activity in this condition of 
dispersal a broad set of infrastructures was implemented.65 Belgian policy makers were 
convicted that such an effort would cost less than the expenses associated with an economic 
model based on industrial concentration (the construction of housing and other facilities for 
labourers, the establishing of safety and hygienic measures and institutions, etc.).66 
Courtoy’s clustering of the different production units in the Liege basin, however, are an 
example of the benefits that could be gained from accumulation, very tellingly illustrated in his 
placing of the load diagrams of different types of companies on top of each other (figure 1). 
Constrained by technological, legal or financial limits such forms of accumulation had for a 
long time only been attainable by physical concentration. As an electrical engineer, Courtoy 
understood that the relatively light and inexpensive infrastructure that could be used to construct 
connections between the different production units made possible the production of such 
beneficial effects of accumulation in electricity production and distribution. His endeavours can 
be seen as the gradually expanding of the scale in which these effects were achieved with at 
different scales new (types of) problems surfacing and having to be tackled. Each time a balance 
had to be found between the advantages of dispersal and those of accumulation. This is certainly 
apparent in his vision on the national organisation of the electricity sector in which a careful 
integration between the different levels of the company / production unit, the region and the 
nation is of primordial importance.  
In the search for this balance, Courtoy’s perception of electricity as primarily being a resource 
rather than a product would bring him at odds with the producer-distributors. Instead of linking 
a range of production units, the fairly homogenous condition of a diversity of small-scale, 
loosely-connected fragments juxtaposed offered these companies the opportunity to gather a 
critical mass of consumers all over the territory. If Courtoy refers to the motto ‘union makes 
strength’ that of the producer-distributors could have been ‘divide and rule’. For the latter the 
dispersed territory had become a condition in which their production of electricity was 
embedded; for the industrial self-producers it was an obstacle in the (more advantageous) 
reproduction of the context in which they operated. Still, both types of companies could avail 
with a more efficient production of electricity. Time and again, this shared objective would 
bring them together during times of crisis. 
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The division within the electricity production sector is as well clearly visible in the maps. 
During the 1930’s, the area of activity of the electricity unions covers almost half of the national 
territory (figure 7). This territory is characterised by the strong presence of industry in a long 
stretch of relatively well-demarcated coal basins, which are all heavily associated with mining 
and metallurgy. These industries require large facilities and are bound by some geographical 
conditions, making the establishment of electricity unions (and the distribution of surplus 
energy to the industrial basin’s hinterland) more plausible. In contrast, the territory of the 
producer-distributors which covered the other half of the country was more marked by a 
historical network of merchant towns. Industrial activities, population and the traffic flows of 
persons and materials were more spread out and more diverse.67 This situation was to the 
advantage of the producer-distributors.  
Courtoy’s industrial perspective becomes again apparent in how he deals with the more 
secluded parts of Belgium, in the southern, western and eastern corners of the territory (figure 
5). While smaller interior regions with less electricity production could often be serviced by the 
national network that connected the more productive regions of the country, these parts required 
specific solutions. The less industrialised and hilly most southern part of Belgium is simply 
annexed by the UCE and the electricity production of the steel industry of the Grand Duchy of 
Luxembourg. The potential construction of hydroelectric plants in this area will, however, also 
have contributed to this decision. In the most western province, Courtoy chose to establish the 
main point of connection in the south-eastern part of the province where there was more 
industrial activity. This made that urban, at times historical, cores with less industry were not 
directly connected to the high voltage grid. In the north-eastern part of Belgium Courtoy 
counted on the emerging mining industry. Remarkable here is that these companies worked in 
close and good cooperation with producer-distributors, probably because they still had to focus 
on the organisation of their core business.68 
The two perceptions of the role of electricity production – one as the result of a production 
process and another as a resource to be constantly reproduced to enable other production 
processes – ensued different approaches to the dispersed condition of the Belgian territory. This 
made the organisation of the national electricity production and consumption based on only one 
of these perceptions impossible. A solution, necessitated by the imminent danger of state 
intervention, was found in the assembling of both organisatory logics by making use of a 
common denominator: the financial interests behind the different companies which bridged the 
sector’s divide. In this solution, however, the territorial dimension of the plan proposed by 
Courtoy is lost. Furthermore, the question remains if this is indeed the most efficient, rational 
or economical organisation practicable, which was, after all, the aim Courtoy pursued.  
 
7. Aftermath and Conclusion 
With the secret agreement between the industrial self-producers and the producer-distributors 
in 1936 not all tensions were relieved. Political pressure persisted until the beginning of the 
Second World War and afterwards new attacks on the privileged position of the electricity 
companies were launched by civil society organisations, the labour unions in particular.69 In the 
first years of the postwar period, the organisation of the electricity sector was therefore modified 
into a more corporatist structure.70 This was mainly done by involving other parties than the 
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founding private companies in the structure established in accordance to the 1936 agreement 
and by the integration of new coordinating and regulating institutions this structure. Hence it 
can be argued that the organisation of the sector was based on the foundations laid by the 
agreement between both types of private electricity producers and this almost until the end of 
the 20th century (when a de facto national monopoly was created because of merges in the sector 
and when preparations for the liberalisation of the energy market are made). 
The electricity blocks that organised the sector by their financial interests would gain 
importance as well. Two processes of rationalisation have contributed to this. First, the 
technological advances that enabled the realisation of very large and efficient electricity 
production plants that culminated with the eventual use of nuclear power. Quickly, the 
production capacities of these plants would exceed the needs of a single regional company. 
Second, the possibilities offered by technological, legal, economic and societal developments 
to reduce the fragmentation of the financial interests in the electricity sector. To an increasing 
extent, each financial block would group their activities in the sector around a single company 
and, over time, also the number of blocks would diminish. Both of these rationalisation 
processes were already initiated during the time of the national commission’s study in 1927.71 
Nonetheless, the commission and the negotiators of the 1936 agreement deserve merit by the 
way in which they enabled the consolidation of these processes in an organisation that through 
numerous evolutions would prove capable of efficiently providing this public utility to its users. 
Fernand Courtoy has played a major role in this consolidation. The main principles of the 1927 
report were based on a vision he had developed through his work in the Liege basin. This work 
was motivated by the benefits that could be achieved by the rationalisation of the electricity 
production. This rationalisation took the form of the clustering of diverging production 
facilities; the benefits can be understood as the amelioration of the conditions of production or, 
at least, as the making easier of the reproduction of these conditions of production. This aim 
was not only attainable for a single company, but was taken by Courtoy across different scales 
up to the national level. Besides the more technical aspects of his plan, an important challenge 
was to find an organisation that could be embedded within the dispersed Belgian territory. The 
coordination of regional production unions turned out to be incompatible with the spatial 
strategy of the producer-distributors. In the agreement of 1936 the weakened coordination 
between financial blocks would emerge as a feasible compromise. Although this can be seen as 
a concession to the essence of his vision, Fernand Courtoy’s ideas and initiatives have firmly 
put his mark on the organisation of the Belgian electricity production and distribution sector. 
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